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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [
Air Transport and its Regulators. By RICHARD E. CAVE.S. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1962. Pp. xi, 479. $10.00.
Of the recent deluge of legal literature critical of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, almost all has focused on essentially procedural issues. We have
learned that the CAB needs abler Commissioners,' better definition of
standards and a more rigorous system of stare decisis,2 less stare decisis
and more planning,3 writing of opinions by Commissioners rather than
staff,4 delegation of authority from Commissioners to staff,5 and freedom
from extra-judicial pressures. 6 Few have asked what would seem prior
questions. What tasks should the CAB be attempting? Is there any justifi-
cation for leaving steel, automobiles and other major industries to the
antitrust system while singling out a few industries such as air transport
for comprehensive economic regulation of entry, price levels, price
structure and accounts?
Certainly the tradition of administrative law teaching in the United
States tends to accept the purported substantive goals of regulation while
concentrating on the procedural techniques for reaching those goals.
Only in the case of the National Labor Relations Board and, to a lesser
extent the Securities and Exchange Commission, do substantive policies
face systematic academic scrutiny. This tradition is curious. In antitrust,
taxation and other public law fields, law teachers and writers do not
hesitate to evaluate and criticize substantive rules.
Analyses of the CAB have all too seldom asked whether the Board's
difficulties do not stem from attempting to do an overly complex, yet
economically trivial, job.7 In these circumstances the legal profession is
I Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 429(1960). This approach was later characterized by Judge Friendly as "too facile." Preface
to THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES vii (1962).
2 FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 74-105 (1962); and see Jaffe, Book
Review, 76 HARv. L. REv. 858, 864 (1963) (calling for "effective operating rational-
izations').
3 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulation Commission (The
Hector Memorandum), 69 YALE L.J. 931, 932-938 (1960).
4 Id. at 944-48; Landis; The Administrative Process-The Third Decade, 13 AD. L.
REv. 17, 21-22 (1960).
5 Boyd, Improving the Administrative Process: A View from the CAB, 14 AD. L. REV.
108 (1961).
6 E.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIvE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 43 (Comm. Print 1960).
7 But see Professor W. K. Jones' recognition in his perceptive study for the Adminis-
trative Conference of the CAB's licensing procedures that "a reexamination of both
substantive policies and their procedural implementation would open a number of
avenues for change." Jones, Report on the Licensing of Domestic Air Transportation,
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indebted to an economist, Richard E. Caves, whose Air Transport and its
Regulators does not hesitate to ask the crucial questions for us and to
go further in answering them than any other study to date.
Most arguments for comprehensive regulation run along one of two
lines-either that the industry is characterized by too little competition
or by too much, and therefore competition cannot be depended upon
to fulfill its traditional role of allocating resources and determining
appropriate prices. Within the "too little" category fall the "natural
monopoly" industries such as electric power or telephone service. Where
only one firm can exist in a given area, it is thought necessary to regulate
prices in order to preclude monopoly profits and to regulate entry in
order to eliminate the "waste" which is said inevitably to occur when-
ever some suicidal speculator attempts to establish a second firm. In
the "too much" category the notion is that certain industries are char-
acterized by "destructive" competition-too many small, irresponsible
firms engaged in a death struggle, cutting corners and failing to provide
adequate service, and that unless economic regulation is imposed to
create order, resources will be wasted in internecine warfare and in the
end only a single monopoly firm will remain. Such, for example, was
the proferred justification for the Motor Carrier Act of 1985. While both
arguments, however inconsistent, are advanced to support comprehensive
economic regulation of the air transport industry, neither fits the facts.
The natural monopoly argument proves inapplicable because, quite
aside from the large number of carriers flying within the United States
and the substantial competition provided by railroad, bus and private
automobile, an overwhelming percentage of the major city-pairs support
more than one air carrier and some one-half of all city-pairs have a
single carrier only because in the absence of direct subsidy there would
be no air service at all.8 Nor has the Board treated the industry as a
"natural monopoly" industry. Caves concludes that the rate of return
for air carriers has been about average for incorporated business gener-
ally9 while the CAB, far from imposing a limit on carrier earnings, has
treated price competition-at least within a given class of service-as
anathema and has been wary of condoning any competitive moves which
threaten to reduce profits1 0 The return on equity of 16 per cent for the
larger trunkline carriers, 18 percent for the smaller trunkline carriers,
and 21.35 per cent for local-service carriers, which the CAB has approved
reprinted in SLEarED REPORTS OF THE ADMINmSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNTE
STATES, p. 388, SENATE JuDiCIARY COMMrrrEE, 88th CONG., ist SESS. (1963).
8 CAVEs 12-30.
9 CAVEs 393-94.
10 CAvs 369-77.
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in recent fare-level cases, does not suggest overly stringent regulation."
What then should we conclude about the opposing explanation-that
the law of the CAB is all that stands between the airlines and the law
of the jungle; that without regulation of entry the airline industry would
be flooded with new entrants, armed with baling wire, greed and little
else; and that the industry would dissolve in a bitter war-to-the-end
for a few choice markets, leaving the rest of the country either without
service or with a single monopoly carrier?12 The answer that appears
from Caves' work is that the "destructive" competition argument does
not fit the facts. First, there is no evidence of destructive competition
before the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. The low
profits then prevailing had other causes and the carriers, the principal
advocates of regulation, had just as much incentive to eliminate com-
petition in general as "destructive" competition. Second, while the CAB
has not admitted a single carrier to trunkline status since 1938,
Caves finds little reason to believe that entry into particular city-pair
markets has been seriously restricted, particularly since the mid-1950's.
He finds it "hard to point to any group of air routes that has for long
had many less than the maximum number of carriers that could occupy
it efficiently ... "13 Third, the argument is weak on analytical grounds.
There is no reason to believe that unsubsidized carriers would give up
markets that they now serve profitably in order to throw resources into
money-losing battles in the few largest markets. Nor is there any reason
to believe that businessmen would throw money away by entering mar-
kets with a full complement of existing carriers unless they believed
that they would be more efficient than existing carriers. If that proved
to be the case, one ought to welcome the entry. Whatever the financial
fortunes of individual firms, few assets are lost to society when a firm
fails, given the "relatively perfect and world-wide" resale market in
planes,14 the demand for specialized air line personnel and the existing
system under which airports and many ground facilities are owned by
11 CAvEs 394.
12 See, e.g., the following "analysis" provided by the President of the Air Transport
Association, the spokesman for the carriers, and a colleague:
"On the day [when entry controls were eliminated], every airline would tear up its
time tables, disregard its certificates, forget that it has franchise responsibilities and
do what business it pleased in the interest of greater profits and not public con-
venience .. .The industry, in such a chaotic struggle for survival, would then have
to abandon service to roughly some 500 of the cities to which it is now certificated, and
operate only between the 50 most profitable pairs of points." Tipton and Gewirtz, The
Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air Transport Industry, 22 J. AR L. & Comr.
157, 190 (1955), quoted in CAvES 382-83.
13 CAVS 230. To this generalization Caves finds, however, "major exceptions in some
of the prime -markets of the Big Four before the mid-1950s." Ibid.
14 CAvEs 106, 136.
parties other than the carriers. Moreover, far from being characterized
by heavy fixed costs and therefore, according to the argument sometimes
heard, susceptible to heavy financial losses under competition, the air-
line industry has surprisingly low fixed costs. 15
The inescapable conclusion is that the airline's structure is deemed
appropriate for regulation not because it is an industry that would other-
wise be characterized by too little or too much competition but because
it falls somewhere between. Ignoring the obvious point that under this
analysis no industry can be deemed inappropriate for comprehensive
economic regulation, we can nevertheless see that what is feared is, to
flourish the talisman, oligopoly. Barring certain technical arguments
based on "second-best" theorizing,1 the usual fear is that the few firms
which constitute an oligopolistic industry will act collusively, either
tacitly or overtly, in order to participate in the monopoly profits which a
single firm could reap. If fear of oligopoly is the justification for regu-
lation, then it seems appropriate to ask whether CAB policies have been
designed to prevent collusion. Since the antitrust system alone presum-
ably could deal with overt collusion, we should really be interested in
tacit collusion. In a market with few firms tacit collusion really refers
to a situation where these few firms act with full realization of their
interdependence, avoiding price-cutting and other tactics which could
cause industry output and prices to depart from that deemed optimum
for a single monopoly firm.
Accepting, then, for the purpose of discussion the oligopoly justifica-
tion for regulation, one is struck by Caves' conclusion that, far from fos-
tering price competition, the CAB has gone out of its way to discourage
all price competition. Differences of view among the carriers over the
most profitable fare strategy for the industry have not been permitted to
erupt in differences in fares.' 7 Caves further finds that the CAB has on
balance discouraged quality alternation or class-of-service proliferation
strategies that might in part substitute for price competition.' 8 If the
CAB's power over entry has been at all effective, its effect must have
been to protect entrenched oligopolists from the disturbing effect on
market share and price that is associated with new entrants. Doctrines of
primary and exclusive jurisdiction have tended to ward off unsettling
radiations from antitrust. Oligopoly plus regulation may add up only
to effective oligopoly behavior.
15 CAvES 80-82.
16 See Lipsey and Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. OF ECON.
STUDIES 11 (1956).
17 CAvEs 154-55, 232.
18 CAVEs 232-39, 250-52.
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Even if one dismisses the natural monopoly, excessive competition and
oligopoly arguments, one is met with a host of assertions concerning the
deterioration of service that would supposedly accompany deregulation.
Safety. would decline. Or the planes would never leave on time. Or
reservations would be unobtainable. It is difficult to know how to
evaluate such unsupported assertions. It is not at all dear why a firm,
faced with competition and seeking to make money, would eliminate
maintenance, scheduling or reservations while a regulated firm, more
assured of profits by the regulatory policies we have observed, would
nonetheless incur the necessary expenditures. If the answer is that the
regulated firm is specifically required to provide prescribed levels of
maintenance, to adhere to advance schedules and to maintain a reserva-
tion service, then surely the imposition of specific requirements does not
depend on the additional paraphernalia of entry controls, fare proceed-
ings and the like. As Caves points out, one can imagine a system of safety
regulation unrelated to economic regulation. Indeed, the division of
authority between the CAB and the Federal Aviation Authority is
grounded on just such a distinction.19
Aside from the effects one can expect from helping an oligopoly to
succeed, the principal effect of the CAB's policies appears to be to chan-
nel a much greater stream of resources into the airline industry than
would have been the case under competition. It has achieved this effect
by inducing much earlier and therefore greater investment in new air-
craft than the airlines would have made under competition and by sub-
sidizing service by local-service airlines in smaller communities. 20 The
greater stream of resources has been financed in two ways: first, by higher
fares firms are permitted to charge as a result of regulatory protection
from new entry and from price and product competition; and second,
by cold cash advanced by the Government through the mail-pay scheme
or otherwise. If resources were not scarce, one might hesitate to quarrel
with such a policy. But excess investment in one industry tends to be
made at the cost of investment, or goods and services to society, in other
industries.21 To what extent such diversion of investment is desirable
for military, technological or social purposes is a crucial, but all-too-
19 CAvEs 437.
20 Until the early 1950s the CAB subsidized even the trunklines serving -major popu-
lation centers.
21 The issue of the appropriate levels of government expenditures and of the
deficit should not be confused with the question of the source of the real resources
to be consumed. SEE DENISON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIc GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE Us (Comm. for Economic Development, Supp. Paper
No. 13) (1962). The discussion also rules out the possibility of the existence of external
economies which might justify subsidy. CAvES 430.
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seldom analyzed, issue.22 In any event, one of the consequences of subsidy
has often been regulation. One of the most interesting aspects of Caves'
study is his suggestive analysis of the special sets of incentives faced by
a firm under direct subsidy. Subsidy seems ineluctably to induce controls
on the receiver's conduct. Since one can conceive of incentive forms of
subsidy which would not require direct control of behavior, it is worth
asking whether the felt need to subsidize justifies the accompanying
regulation.
Given this desire to subsidize by higher fares and direct grant, which
apparently is what is meant by the "promotional role" of the Board,
what can one say about the cost of regulation itself? Here Caves' analysis
is scanty but suggestive. The legacy of the CAB has been a patchwork
series of route certifications with a welter of special restrictions requiring
intermediate stops, prohibiting intermediate stops, requiring through
service, prohibiting through service and so forth, all designed to help
weak carriers, offset advantages to connecting carriers, and accomplish
all of the other minor policies with which CAB jurisprudence abounds.
The effect, as Caves indicates, is to create inefficiency in routing of planes,
seasonal imbalances and other artificial constraints which can only be
translated into costs to the economy.23
One other kind of cost which Caves does not adequately analyze, no
doubt because he is not a lawyer, is at the heart of the current debate
in the legal literature. Professor Cramton has suggested that regulatory
agencies, instead of focusing on the crucial questions of market structure,
have devoted themselves to questions of equity which make little eco-
nomic difference-such as determining which one of two or more apply-
ing carriers is to get a new route award and what restrictions on the
certificate have to be imposed to balance the competitive advantages of
incumbent and new carriers. Given the judicialization of administrative
procedure with the adversary system, cross-examination, record-building
and promiscuous intervention, the inevitable consequence is that the
resources of the agency are overtaxed on economically trivial issues. 24 No
degree or combination of ability, definition of standards, procedural
reform and planning can reduce this cost of regulation.
22 The current debate over a supersonic plane is suggestive. While the debate cen-
ters on a one billion dollar subsidy to produce such a plane, it is seldom asked
whether that one billion dollars worth of resources should be denied other sectors
of the economy.
23 CAvEs 420, 430-31. Caves also suggests that the outdated route systems which are
the legacy of regulation lead to a less-than-optimum choice of equipment such as
"owning small numbers of -many kinds of planes or of using planes on a route that
are less suited than other types available."
24 Crampton, The Effectiveness of Economic Regulation-a Legal View, 54 Am.
ECON. R v. 182 (1964).
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Caves was not, of course, preparing lenses for lawyer's myopia and
so his insights on the role of economic regulation are to a certain extent
sandwiched among the large bodies of factual material which are the
hallmark of an economist's "industry study." Of the four parts into
which the book is divided, Part I supplies the conventional data on
concentration, elasticity of demand, costs and barriers to entry which lies
within the peculiar competence of the economist. Part II, which will be
more familiar to the lawyer, describes the pattern of regulation. This
material, which combines legal, administrative and economic insights,
is of high quality. Part III, in a return to more conventional economic
analysis, considers the market conduct of the carriers with particular
emphasis on pricing, investment and product strategies. Part IV, dealing
with market performance-and particularly the last chapter on "Per-
formance, Structure arid the Goals of Regulation" which is a kind of
summary plus speculation-is the most interesting but at the same time
the most sketchy and impressionistic.
This reviewer does not purport to be technically competent to judge
the economic materials. One draws comfort, however, from the care with
which the legal materials are handled. At the same time one is troubled
by the scantiness of the data on which some of the economic judgments
are made. Some of Caves' judgments, particularly where he speculates
about what would happen in the absence of regulation, seem to be made
-perhaps inevitably-as much from a priori reasoning as from evidence.
It will, however, always be difficult to know what would happen if a
regulated industry became unregulated. A lack of knowledge of conse-
quences did not, of course, deter the Congress from imposing regulation
in the first place. And it is cold comfort to recbgnize that the CAB itself
has often not been able to predict the consequences of changes in its
regulatory policies. To seek the consequences of deregulation tends to
be, barring transitional questions, only a somewhat more complicated
way of asking what the consequences of regulation are in the first place.
The only scientific way of getting at the consequences of regulation of
a particular industry is to isolate a control group-an otherwise identical
industry which is not regulated. There are two principal albeit imperfect
sources of such a control group-the same industry prior to regulation
and the same industry in unregulated intrastate transactions. 25 Caves
despairs of learning anything about the airline industry from the first
method; the industry was relatively immature prior to the 1938 Act and
was in any event heavily regulated even then by the Post Office Depart-
25 For a promising beginning using primarily the pre-regulation approach, see
Stigler and Friedland, What Can the Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity
(mimeo 1963); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964).
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ment and other bodies. It may be that in spite of the paucity of instances,
Caves could have done more with the available material on relatively
unregulated intrastate activities, particularly the San Francisco-Los
Angeles-San Diego markets where, it is said, one finds a good deal of
price competition, adequate service and relatively low fares. 26
One of the strengths of Caves' work is that he does not fail to face
squarely the practical question of how deregulation should be conducted.
However strongly one may oppose regulation and rue the tendency of
regulatory programs to be irreversible, one must acknowledge the transi-
tional difficulties which deregulation would produce. A palatable plan
for deregulation should minimize windfall gains and losses and should
provide some assurance of an acceptable minimum of service during the
transition period for those markets thought to be viable under com-
petition.
Caves' first step would be to open large city-pair markets to unlimited
entry by presently certificated unsubsidized carriers. Rather prompt rear-
rangement of routes and more efficient use of carriers and ground
facilities could be anticipated. At the same time he would set maximum
and minimum fares 10 per cent above and below existing fares and
remove restrictions on the creation of new classes of service. Step two
would be the elimination of entry controls on new, previously uncerti-
ficated carriers in these same big-city markets. The last step would be
to open all remaining unsubsidized city-pair markets to the regime of
open competition. Sufficient time would elapse between each of the three
transitional stages to permit stabilization of the industry, thereby
minimizing the transitional effects of deregulation. 27
Caves has thus offered material for the first round of what could be,
whatever the final conclusion, a most productive debate on the purposes
and consequences of comprehensive economic regulation. Whether the
proponents of regulation will face the challenge squarely or elude it with
the comfortable maxims of an earlier, more optimistic era remains to
be seen.
KENNETH W. DAM*
26 CAVES 13, 88-89, 96, 134-35, 371-72.
27 Caves apparently sees no alternative to CAB regulation of local-service carriers
so long as direct subsidy is continued.
0 Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
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